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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In reversing the Tax Court decision, the Court of Appeals main-
tained that all contractual rights incident to ownership had been trans-
ferred. It cannot be assumed that the divorce court would prohibit
exercise of ownership powers where occasion required.5 4 Therefore the
first requirement to premium deductibility - assignment of policy
ownership to the divorced spouse - had been fulfilled. The provision of
the agreement terminating the former spouse's interest in the proceeds
if she predeceased the taxpayer is not the kind of contingency which will
forestall operation of the constructive receipt principle where the chil-
dren are irrevocably designated contingent beneficiaries. 5 As assignee
and irrevocable beneficiary of the policy the former spouse construc-
tively received a taxable benefit. Accordingly, the premium payments
are includible as part of her gross income and deductible by the hus-
band. 0
As a result of Stevens the constructive receipt doctrine will now be
scrutinized more practically. If, in fact, a current economic benefit has
been rendered to the former wife, it is now more likely that that benefit
will be taxable to her and deductible by her former husband.
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS -ALLOCATION OF INCOME
Section 482 of the Code provides that the Secretary of the Treasury
or his delegate may allocate among two or more commonly controlled
businesses "gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances" if he
determines that such allocation is necesary in order "to prevent evasion
of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of the business.57 A determina-
54 439 F.2d at 72.
55 Id. In acknowledging that such an interpretation differs from that of the Seventh
Circuit (see note 48 supra), the court said:
To deny constructive receipt of benefit whenever the wife's interest in the proceeds
is contingent on her surviving her former spouse is to presume that an insurance
policy's only value to the beneficiary lies in receipt of the face amount upon death
of the insured. If this analysis were correct, premiums paid on a term insurance
policy could never qualify as alimony payments because the protection of term
insurance to an irrevocable beneficiary extends only for a specified period rather
than over the life of the insured .... Rather the contingencies which will deny
deductibility are those which might operate to thwart the wife's receipt of the eco-
nomic benefit the premium payments conferred, that is, the protection, during a
limited term, of the wife's right to receive alimony over the full alimony period.
Such contingencies include the husband's retention of the power to borrow against
the policy, to withdraw its cash surrender value or to substitute himself as bene-
ficiary if the wife predeceases him.
Id.
56 Only $850, the amount claimed by the husband in the Tax Court proceedings, was
includible or deductible. See note 49 supra.
57 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 482. The purpose of this section is to place a controlled
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer. This is done by determining the
net income of the property and business of a controlled taxpayer, according to the stan-
dards of an uncontrolled taxpayer. Tennessee Life Ins. Co. v. Phinney, 280 F.2d 38 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960); Simon J. Murphy Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 639
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tion by the Commissioner under section 482 is essentially one of fact and
must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.5 The Commis-
sioner has broad discretion in appraising particular fact situations. 9 His
determinations wll not be set aside unless clearly shown to be unreason-
able or arbitrary,60 and the taxpayer has the burden of proving that this
discretion has been abused.61
(6th Cir. 1956); Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1(b)(I) (1968).
"Control," as used in the statute, includes:
any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however
exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control which is decisive, not its
form of the mode of its exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or
deductions have been arbitrarily shifted.
Treas. Reg. § IA82-1(a)(3) (1968). Common control is not affected merely because some of
the owners of the controlled businesses are different. Nor is allocation of income among
related businesses justified merely on account of common control. Hall v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Davis v. United States, 282 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1960);
Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
819 (1953). Compare Lake Erie & P. Ry. Co., 5 T.C. 558 (1945), with Texsun Supply Corp.,
17 T.C. 433 (1951).
Section 482 can only be invoked by the Commissioner and its use is not a matter of
right with the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § lA82-1(b)(3) (1968). However, the Commissioner may
be estopped to deny its use. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Tenn. 1963), aJ'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1964). In determining the
true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer the Commissioner is not restricted to cases
involving fraud, deliberate tax avoidance or improper accounting. The authority to allocate
extends to any case in which taxable income, either by inadvertence or design, of a con-
trolled taxpayer, is other than it would have been had there been an uncontrolled indi-
vidual dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled individual. George W. Knipe,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1965), al'd per curiam sub. nor. Equitable Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 356 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1966); Mel Dar Corp. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 525
(9th Cir. 1962); Treas. Reg. § IA82-1(c). See generally 7 MERTENS § 38.61 et seq.
ri Advance Mach. Exch. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 835 (1952).
69 Treas. Reg. § .482-1(b)(1) (1968) provides that
[t]he interests controlling a group of controlled taypayers are asumed to have com-
plete power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its
transactions and accounting records truly reflect the taxable income from the
property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers. If, however, this has not
been done, and the taxable incomes are thereby understated, the district director
shall intervene, and, by making such distributions, apportionments, or allocations
as he may deem necessary of gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances, or
of any item or element affecting taxable income . . . , shall determine the true
taxable income of each controlled taxpayer.
See also Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 344
U.S. 874 (1952).
60 Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963). Section 482
does not permit the Commissioner to allocate income and deductions simply because he
finds that the common owners have the power to shift income. His authority extends only
to cases wherein an allocation is necessary to prevent the evasion of taxes or to clearly
reflect income. Bush Hog Mfg. Co., 42 T.C. 713 (1964); cf. T. R. Vardeman v. United States,
209 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tex. 1962); Motor & Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Scofield, 55-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9493 (D.C.W.D. Tex. 1955). In Bank of Kimball v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 638
(S.D.S.D. 1962), the court rejected the Commissioner's allocation as arbitrary, and then
proceeded to make its own allocation on the basis of the Cohan rule, note 27 supra.
01 Hall v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Brentwood Homes,
Inc. v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 378 (D.C.E.D.N.C. 1965), aff'd sub. nom. J.R. Land Co.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In Phillipp Brothers Chemicals v. Commissioner,62 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Commissioner's allocation of
all of the net income of five commonly controlled foreign sales corpora-
tions to an affiliated New York corporation, holding that there was
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's allocation. The New
York corporation was the principal corporation of a group of eleven
corporations organized by an individual to engage in the business of
buying and reselling industrial and agricultural chemicals. All eleven
corporations during the period in question were under the control of
the same interests.6 3 The shipping and bookkeeping arrangements for
all the corporations were handled in the office of the New York corpora-
tion. Only one of the five foreign sales corporations maintained an in-
ventory. On their returns for 1960 and 1962 the five foreign sales
corporations claimed no deductions for salaries, wages or rent, except
for a single item claimed by one of them. 64
The court indicated that section 482 was specifically designed to
combat situations such as presented in this case.65 Income is taxable to
the party who earns it. Economic reality, not legal formality, determines
who earns income.66 In rejecting the contention that the Commissioner
cannot, as a matter of law, reallocate the entire income of a corporation
unless such a corporation is a sham, the court highlighted the fact that
there was no evidence that the foreign sales corporations actually did
anything at all. In such a case, a one hundred percent reallocation is
appropriate. 67 As the taxpayer did not meet the burden of showing that
v. United States, 361 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1966); LE. Shunk Latex Rubber Prod., Inc., 18
T.C. 940 (1952).
62435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970).
63 The individual who organized all eleven was president of each corporation. Nearly
ninety percent of the stock of each of the five foreign sales corporations was owned by the
president and his family.
64 One corporation claimed a $472 deduction for salesmen's expenses. There was no
evidence that the foreign corporations had any employees. The sole deductions for 1960 and
1962 were for charitable contributions, taxes, minimal amounts for office, legal and ac-
counting expenses, and special tax-saving deductions for Western Hemisphere trade cor-
porations. (See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 sections 921 and 922).
65435 F.2d at 57.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 58. The proposition cited by the taxpayer referred to the court's decision in
W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 896 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968). In Braun the court stated that
[t]he Commissioner was therefore not justified in arbitrarily allocating all of
Braunware's taxable income to petitioner. Such an allocation is authorized only
where there is no business purpose to the challenged transaction or corporate
structure. Section 482 does not give the Commisioner the power to disregard
separate corporate entities if they are being used for a bona fide business purpose.
Id. at 268. The court felt Braun was distinguishable in that substantial evidence indicating
that the separate corporation performed some business functions, as evidenced in that case,
which fact was lacking here. 435 F.2d at 58. See also National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144
F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944).
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this allocation was unjustified, the Commissioner's findings must be
affirmed.
As the Phillipp decision indicates, section 482 is a principal weapon
in attacking taxpayer transactions. Although there is nothing in Phillipp
to indicate that the burden of proving that the Commissioner's actions,
in applying section 482, were unreasonable or arbitrary is appreciably
greater than the burden of overcoming the presumptive correctness of
the Commissioner's determinations in most civil tax litigation, it would
appear that the proof required by section 482 is nearly unattainable. If
this becomes a fact the authorization to make allocations under section
482 will provide a sword for revenue producing, not a shield to preclude
the loss of revenue through artificial arrangements among controlled
entities. The thrust of section 482 must therefore be employed only
where the principal purpose of the questioned transaction was to avoid
federal income tax.
ESTATE TAXATION
Section 2055(a)(3) of the Code provides for a deduction from the
decedent's gross estate for the value of property transferred to a trustee
if used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to childern or animals.
The deductions will be disallowed if a substantial part of the activities
of the transferee is "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation .... 68 Other provisions of section 2055 allow a de-
duction for similar transfers: to or for the use of a domestic govern-
mental body for exclusively public purposes;69 to or for the use of any
corporation organized or operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes; 70 and to or for the use of any
An additional contention that the foreign sales corporations had a right to receive
some income from the transactions which were assigned to them by the New York office,
because their capital was at risk, was also denied. No sales contracts, insurance policies, or
shipping documents were put into evidence to indicate that the foreign corporations did,
in fact, risk capital, as it appeared to the court that "after a profitable sale had been
completely arranged by the New York corporation, it was thereafter arbitarily assigned to
one of the foreign corporations." 435 F.2d at 58.
68 Ir. Ray. CODE OF 1954 § 2055(a)(3). The Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 487,
added the requirement that transfers of property made after December 31, 1969 will not
be deductible if the transferee in any way participates in any political campaign. 83 Stat.
553.
69 INT. REv. CODE Or 1954 § 2055(a)(1).
70 d. § 2055(a)(2). No part of the net earnings of the corporation may enure to the
benefit of any private stockholder or individual. Id. The prohibition concerning propaganda
activities applicable in section 2055(a)(3) also applies here. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1(a)(4)
(1958) does not strictly enforce the provision that the transferee must be a corporation;
any institution meeting the requirements will suffice.
1972]
